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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
U.S. law on securities fraud, particularly insider trading, is a common 
law creation constructed with federal courts’ interpretations and applications 
of Rule 10b-5.1  Since O’Hagan,2 so is outsider trading.3 Rule 10b-5 was 
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College; MA, New York University; JD, Northwestern University School of Law. The author thanks 
primary discussant Prof. Robert Prentice and other commentators for their constructive criticism and 
suggestions in the 2020 American Business Law Journal Invited Scholars Colloquium. All proposals, 
assertions, and errors in the article remain the author’s. 
 1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011) (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, . . . 
[t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, . . . or . . .  [t]o engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security.”). 
 2. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 3. See generally, Thomas M. Madden, O’Hagan, 10b5-2, Relationships and Duties, 4 HASTINGS 
BUS. L.J. 55 (2008). By “outsider trading”, I mean actions found in violation of SEC rules promulgated 
under Section 10(b) which actions are not premised on a fiduciary relationship owed by the securities 
trading party to the issuer of those securities nor to that issuer’s stockholders. Outsider trading is premised 
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promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or 
Commission) under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19344 
(Section 10(b)) is the Commission’s primary anti-fraud provision governing 
securities transactions. Since the 1968 Texas Gulf Sulfer5 decision, the 
Second Circuit, perhaps as much as the U.S. Supreme Court, has articulated 
and adopted theories of insider and outsider trading. No such theory has been 
more contentious than the misappropriation theory as codified by the 
 
on the fraud on the source version of the misappropriation theory adopted in Justice Ginsburg’s majority 
opinion in O’Hagan. 
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010). It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use 
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue 
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in 
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
 5. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (establishing the disclose or 
abstain rule). 
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Commission in Rules 10b5-16 and 10b5-27 subsequent to the Supreme 
Court’s adoption of fraud-on-the-source misappropriation in the 1997 
O’Hagan decision.8 
 
 6. Rule 10b5-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2021). Trading “On the Basis Of” Material Nonpublic 
Information in Insider Trading Cases. 
Preliminary Note to Rule 10b5-1: This provision defines when a purchase or sale constitutes trading 
“on the basis of” material nonpublic information in insider trading cases brought under Section 10(b) of 
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. The law of insider trading is otherwise defined by judicial 
opinions construing Rule 10b-5, and Rule 10b5-1 does not modify the scope of insider trading law in any 
other respect. 
(a) General. The “manipulative and deceptive devices” prohibited by Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder include, among other things, the purchase or sale of 
a security of any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic information about that security or 
issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, 
to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the 
source of the material nonpublic information. 
(b) Definition of “On the Basis Of.” Subject to the affirmative defenses in paragraph (c) of this 
Rule 10b5-1, a purchase or sale of a security of an issuer is “on the basis of” material nonpublic 
information about that security or issuer if the person making the purchase or sale was aware 
of the material nonpublic information when the person made the purchase or sale. 
(c) Affirmative Defenses. 
(1) (i) Subject to paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this Rule 10b5-1, a person’s purchase or sale is not “on 
the basis of” material nonpublic information if the person making the purchase or sale 
demonstrates that: 
(A) Before becoming aware of the information, the person had: 
(1) Entered into a binding contract to purchase or sell the security, 
(2) Instructed another person to purchase or sell the security for the instructing person’s 
account, or 
(3) Adopted a written plan for trading securities; 
(B) The contract, instruction, or plan described in paragraph (c)(1)(i)(A): 
(1) Specified the amount of securities to be purchased or sold and the price at which and the 
date on which the securities were to be purchased or sold; 
(2) Included a written formula or algorithm, or computer program, for determining the amount 
of securities to be purchased or sold and the price at which and the date on which the securities 
were to be purchased or sold; or 
(3) Did not permit the person to exercise any subsequent influence over how, when, or whether 
to effect purchases or sales; provided, in addition, that any other person who, pursuant to the 
contract, instruction, or plan, did exercise such influence must not have been aware of the 
material nonpublic information when doing so; and 
(C) The purchase or sale that occurred was pursuant to the contract, instruction, or plan. A 
Purchase or sale is not “pursuant to a contract, instruction, or plan” if, among other things, the 
person who entered into the contract, instruction, or plan to purchase or sell securities (whether 
by changing the amount, price, or timing of the purchase or sale), or entered into or altered a 
corresponding or hedging transaction or position with respect to those securities. 
(ii) Paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this Rule 10b5-1 is applicable only when the contract, instruction, or 
plan to purchase or sell securities was given or entered into in good faith and not as part of a 
plan or scheme to evade the prohibitions of this Rule 10b5-1. 
(iii) This subparagraph defines certain terms as used in paragraph (c). 
(A) Amount. “Amount” means either a specified number of shares of other securities or a 
specified dollar value of securities. 
(B) Price. “Price” means the market price on a particular date or a limit price, or a particular 
dollar price. 
(C) Date. “Date” means, in the case of a market order, the specific day of the year on which 
the order is to be executed (or as soon thereafter as is practicable under ordinary principles of 
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Since O’Hagan, the misappropriation theory and its codification in 
2000 in Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 has remained underutilized, if not 
controversial. Why? The core of critiques and discussions on the topic 
ultimately center on the concept of fiduciary duty.9 The federal courts have 
failed to adequately elucidate the proper role of fiduciary duty in the federal 
common law of insider, and now outsider, trading nearly twenty years after 
the Commission’s promulgation of Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2; rules intended 
to settle broadly recognized incongruity surrounding the role.10  
 
best execution). “Date” means, in the case of a limit order, a day of the year on which the limit 
order is in force. 
(2) A person other than a natural person also may demonstrate that a purchase or sale of 
securities is not “on the basis of” material nonpublic information if the person demonstrates 
that: 
(i) The individual making the investment decision on behalf of the person to purchase or sell 
the securities was not aware of the information; and 
(ii) The person had implemented reasonable policies and procedures, taking into consideration 
the nature of the person’s business, to ensure that individuals making investment decisions 
would not violate the laws prohibiting trading on the basis of material nonpublic information. 
These policies and procedures may include those that restrict any purchase, sale, and causing 
any purchase or sale of any security as to which the person has material nonpublic information, 
or those that prevent such individuals from becoming aware of such information. 
 7. Rule 10b5-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2021). Duties of Trust or Confidence in Misappropriation 
Insider Trading Cases. Preliminary Note to Rule 10b5-2: This Rule 10b5-2 provides a nonexclusive 
definition of circumstances in which a person has a duty of trust or confidence for purposes of the 
“misappropriation” theory of insider trading under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. 
The law of insider trading is otherwise defined by judicial opinions construing Rule 10b-5, and Rule 
10b5-2 does not modify the scope of insider trading law in any other respect. 
(a) Scope of Rule. This Rule 10b5-2 shall apply to any violation of Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder that is based on the purchase or sale of securities on 
the basis of, or the communication of, material nonpublic information misappropriated in 
breach of a duty of trust or confidence. 
(b) Enumerated “Duties of Trust or Confidence.” For purposes of this Rule 10b5-2, a “duty of 
trust or confidence” exists in the following circumstances, among others: 
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence; 
(2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information and the person to 
whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, such that 
the recipient of the information knows or reasonably should know that the person 
communicating the material nonpublic information expects that the recipient will maintain its 
confidentiality; or 
(3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information from his or her 
spouse, parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person receiving or obtaining the 
information may demonstrate that no duty of trust or confidence existed with respect to the 
information, by establishing that he or she neither knew nor reasonably should have known 
that the person who was the source of the information expected that the person would keep the 
information confidential, because of the parties’ history, pattern, or practice of sharing and 
maintaining confidences, and because there was no agreement or understanding to maintain 
the confidentiality of the information. 
 8. See generally, Thomas M. Madden, O’Hagan, 10b5-2, Relationships and Duties, 4 HASTINGS 
BUS. L.J. 55 (2008). 
 9. See generally, Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 
TEX. L. REV. (1999) and Donna Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 
94 IOWA L. REV. 1315 (2009). 
 10. See, e.g., SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 729-31 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated and remanded, 
620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010).  See Robert A. Prentice, Permanently Reviving the Temporary Insider, 36 
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The conundrum this article addresses is the still unclear, still shifting 
federal courts’ understanding of the meaning and role of fiduciary duty under 
Section 10(b), and how it relates and whether it is synonymous with the “duty 
of trust or confidence” addressed in Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 and the federal 
case law interpreting those rules.11 It builds on earlier work seeking to 
examine what use the Commission has made of Rule 10b5-2.12  
Part II of this work frames the current milieu of federal court decisions 
addressing the fiduciary duty conundrum and its associated applications or 
disregard of Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 (with necessary reference to earlier 
precedent under Rule 10b-5). Part III, fleshes out the concept of fiduciary 
duty under Section 10(b), noting its role at the heart of common law 
securities fraud.  Part IV, proposes that modifying and better employing Rule 
10b5-2 would help to clarify the fiduciary conundrum under Section 10(b) 
and would be instrumental in doing away with the common law’s misnomers 
and confusion. 
II. SECURITIES FRAUD, FEDERAL COURTS, AND FIDUCIARY 
DUTY 
Prior to O’Hagan and Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2, common law 
explication of insider trading under Section 10(b), at least since Dirks,13 if 
not Chiarella,14 was generally explicitly premised on the breach of a 
fiduciary duty. This is distinguishable from the Commission’s earlier abstain 
or disclose approach to securities fraud set out in Cady Roberts15, also known 
as the parity-of-information approach.16 
 
IOWA J. CORP. L. 343 (2011) (addressing, inter alia, the role of Rule 10b5-2 in SEC v. Cuban).  See also, 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Symposium: The Past, Present, and Future of Insider Trading Law: A 50th 
Anniversary Re-Examination of Cady, Roberts and the Revolution It Began; Mapping the Future of 
Insider Trading Law: Of Boundaries, Gaps and Strategies, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 281 (2013) 
(addressing the common law of insider trading through the element of deception and proposing Rules 
10b5-3 and 10b5-4). 
 11. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 7881 (Aug. 15, 2000); 17 
C.F.R. 240, 243, 249 (2011); 17 C.F.R. 240.10b5-1 and 10b5-2 (2011). See generally Madden, supra note 
2, at 72-75 (assessing the lack of use or recognition of Rule 10b5-2 in the federal courts). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1983) (holding that an officer of a broker-dealer who 
learned of fraudulent accounting in a corporation and informed clients who traded on the basis of that 
information in securities of the fraud committing corporation owed no fiduciary duty to shareholders of 
the fraud committing corporation in whose stock the clients traded). 
 14. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-30 (1980) (holding that a financial printer 
employee who learned of forthcoming securities transactions owed no fiduciary duty or similar duty of 
trust and confidence to his employer printer clients and had no duty to disclose the information he learned 
of from the printer’s clients, which information motivated his securities trades in issuers involved in the 
forthcoming transactions). 
 15. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 SEC Docket 907 (Nov. 8, 1961). 
 16. See Donald C. Langevoort, Fine Distinctions in the Contemporary Law of Insider Trading, 2013 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 432 (2013) (discussing the transition from SEC Chairman Carey’s influence 
on defining insider trading to Justice Powell’s influence via Chiarella and Dirks) and see generally 
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In both Chiarella and Dirks, Justice Powell was explicit and repetitive 
in using the words “fiduciary duty,” setting out what became known as the 
“classical theory” of insider trading, itself a misnomer in place of securities 
fraud.17  Justice Powell built upon his previous discussion of relationships 
giving rise to duties of trust and confidence in Chiarella and constructed in 
Dirks his general fiduciary breach framework, which he apparently 
envisioned would control future anti-fraud actions brought under Rule 10b-
5.18 In so doing, Powell had perhaps the greatest personal impact on 
establishing federal law on insider trading.  
A.C. Pritchard has documented Justice Powell’s conscious, careful 
construction of a federal fiduciary principle that both contained the 
expansion of Section 10(b) and, for the time being, warded off the Court’s 
adoption of the misappropriation theory.19 It is clear that Powell did this 
expressly to avoid a chilling effect on securities analyst information digging, 
assessment, and reward – pointedly rejecting the earlier parity-of-
information approach to insider trading and focusing instead on relationship 
characteristics that would give rise to a duty.20 Powell sought to construct a 
justifying principle that could control future insider trading cases while not 
dissuading market research and earned advantage.21  Yet, the adopted 
principle, a federal fiduciary duty, has proven both vexing and difficult to 
apply consistently to subsequent trading scenarios. Indeed, several scholars 
have concluded that the very notion of emphasizing fiduciary duty in the 
common law of insider trading was a contrivance.22 
A. POWELL’S CLASSICAL THEORY FIDUCIARY DUTY 
Fiduciary duty is generally defined as a “duty to act for someone else’s 
benefit, while subordinating one’s personal interests to that of the other 
 
Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Review, 70 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1 (1982). 
 17. See Nagy, supra note 9, at 1326 (“Justice Powell invoked the term “fiduciary” a total of seven 
times in Chiarella’s majority opinion.”). 
 18. See A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal 
Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 933 (2003). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 (“Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person 
knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it could have an 
inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the 
preservation of a healthy market.”); see also, Pritchard, supra note 18, at 937-941. 
 21. Pritchard, supra note 18, at 937-41. 
 22. See Nagy, supra note 9, at 1337-40 (discussing “fiduciary fictions” and noting that insider 
trading actually turns on the “wrongful use of confidential information”).  See also Coffee, supra note 
10, at 289-90 (discussing Dirks as a product of its time . . .), Prentice, supra note 10, at 345 (“Obviously, 
insider trading law is a work in progress. Because Congress and the SEC have declined to promulgate a 
specific, thorough definition of insider trading, it has been left to the courts to define it on the fly. Insider 
trading law should be fleshed out in accordance with a reasonable understanding of relevant policy 
considerations.”); and Langevoort, supra note 16, at 440 (writing of insider trading that “[i]t is not really 
fraud, even though we have chosen to call it fraud in order to preserve and embellish the useful message 
of investor protection.”). 
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person. It is the highest standard of duty implied by law (e.g., trustee, 
guardian).”23 It may be that Powell misused the fiduciary duty concept in the 
securities anti-fraud context – largely as a result of the need to fill a void in 
the common law construction of insider trading. While Powell and the 
classical theory depend upon the breach of a known duty described as 
fiduciary duty, that duty may not actually refer to a true fiduciary standard. 
More accurately, as subsequent courts have opined, it may refer to a 
“fiduciary-like” relationship.24 Herein lies the conundrum. 
In the context of tipping as in Dirks, Justice Powell’s version of the 
breach of fiduciary duty under Section 10(b) has two parts.  First, a 
relationship giving rise to a duty must exist.25 (This duty is owed to the 
shareholders of a corporation whose stock is to be traded and the duty may 
be inherited by a tippee.)26  Second, the trader (often tippee) must know or 
should know of both the duty and its breach (the tippee inheriting or deriving 
the duty of the tipper).27 That knowledge, or would-be knowledge, (i) must 
include the existence of a personal benefit to the tipper in tipping the tippee 
and (ii) that personal benefit must be either (a) of a pecuniary nature or (b) 
in the nature of the benefit of gift giving.28 In the Dirks Court’s words, “. . . 
a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to 
trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached 
his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the 
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.”29 
After finding the duty, the determination turns on “whether the insider 
receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a 
pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future 
earnings”30 
 
 “. . . [T]here may be a relationship between the insider and the recipient 
that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the 
particular recipient. The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of 
nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative or friend.  The tip and trade 
resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to 
the recipient.”31  
 
 
 23. Fiduciary Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990). 
 24. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991) (employing the term to 
refer to the relationship at issue under Rule 10b-5). 
 25. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660-61. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 663. 
 28. Id.; See Langevoort, supra note 16 at 447-448. See also, Donna M. Nagy, Beyond Dirks: 
Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 J. CORP. L. 1, 3-4 (2016). 
 29. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660. 
 30. Id. at 663 (emphasis added). 
 31. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. 
36 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 18:1 
This less than crystal clear writing has left subsequent courts to sort out 
what fiduciary duty really means in the securities fraud context, and whether 
the “personal benefit test” applied to determine the purpose of inside 
information disclosure and resultant breach of that duty requires that a tipper 
will at least share in profits via a tippee’s trade.32 Though the underlying 
breach of fiduciary duty is named, the Court’s surrounding verbiage is 
cloudy and in no way explicit. The Court’s language ranges from  “elements” 
or qualities, to duties “like” fiduciary duties. 
Powell’s actual discussion concerning the definition and nature of 
fiduciary duty was quite limited in Dirks.33 His focus was rather on the 
purpose of disclosure in determining breach of the duty and, ultimately, 
deception.34 In looking to Chiarella and Cady Roberts, Powell summarily 
adopted the fiduciary requirement without expounding on it.35 Tellingly, 
however, he quoted language from Chiarella holding that a breach of 
fiduciary duty cannot exist where the party trading on the inside information 
“was not a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of the 
securities] had placed their trust and confidence.”36  In fact, Powell’s version 
of fiduciary duty may, in practice, be more akin to Rule 10b5-2’s codification 
of duties of trust or confidence – which clearly established a lower threshold 
than a true fiduciary relationship of one bound to act in the best interest of 
another.37 Yet, at the very least, Powell’s version does require the finding of 
a relationship of trust and confidence. The conundrum leads us to wonder, 
why all the fuss on the fiduciary terminology when the actual focus appears 
to be on a duty of trust or confidence that can exist outside of strict fiduciary 
relationships obligating one party to act in the best interest of another. 
1. Subsequent Decisions Looking to Powell’s Fiduciary Duty 
Since Dirks, the cloudiness surrounding Powell’s fiduciary duty 
appears to be, at least in part, due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s failure to 
clearly elucidate what defines fiduciary duty in the securities fraud context, 
or what characteristics of such a duty matter in finding deception or fraud 
under Section 10(b). The problem is that subsequent decisions by federal 
circuit and federal district courts have almost continually looked back to 
Dirks to resolve the issue. Of course, this looking back is necessary due to 
our common law system of precedent. In this instance, the precedent is 
problematic because Dirks simply did not give us functional clarity.  
Moreover, the federal courts’ almost inescapable lack of accuracy and 
consistency in embracing and applying the fiduciary duty concept that has 
 
 32. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Informational Cronyism, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 37, 40-
43 (2016). 
 33. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660. 
 34. Id. at 662. 
 35. Id. at 654. 
 36. Id. (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232.) (emphasis added). 
 37. See infra Part II.C. 
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resulted since Dirks, has only grown more puzzling as judge after judge has 
genuinely attempted to make sense of the fiduciary conundrum.38 
 Again, a fiduciary relationship is characterized by a one-way obligation 
born by the fiduciary to act in the best interest of another. This is the sort of 
overt, proactive duty that is not simply one of either unidirectional or 
reciprocal trust and confidence. Yet, in reality, it certainly and logically 
appears that Powell’s real concern with fiduciary duty was in fact with a 
relationship of trust and confidence, not a one-way duty of an agent to act in 
the best interest of a principal or beneficiary. 
The federal court that confronted this reality most directly was the 
Northern District of California in United States v. Joon Kim.39 In Kim, the 
Northern District of California looked to the Second Circuit’s 1991 
Chestman40 decision that informed, and in large part motivated, the 
Commission’s adoption of Rule 10b5-2. Kim attended to the Chestman 
court’s discussion of a similar relationship of trust and confidence in addition 
to a fiduciary relationship per se.41 This expansion was not, however, 
intended in a broad sense.  Rather, the similar relationship of trust and 
confidence was explicitly considered in the sense of a “functional 
equivalent” to fiduciary duty.42 Kim expounded and reiterated that the 
relationship at issue was defined by one side being superior to the other, and 
repeated the need to find “superiority, dominance and control.”43 Thus, the 
Kim court refused to find the existence of such a duty among members of a 
CEO club, though those members regularly shared confidential information, 
because those members shared as equals.44 The Kim court focused on true 
fiduciary duty – most likely interpreting the conundrum more strictly than 
intended. 
Chestman, discussing both classical and misappropriation theories, 
offered perhaps the most robust discussion of both fiduciary duty and the 
companion relationship of trust and confidence.45 On the fiduciary 
relationship, Chestman looked fairly deeply at the nature of a fiduciary and 
included the observation that a fiduciary exercises “discretionary authority” 
for a dependent beneficiary.46 Moreover, the Chestman court noted that the 
relationship entailed the obligation of agent confidentiality.47 Emphasizing a 
narrow scope, Chestman then looked to Reed48 to recognize that a 
 
 38. See infra Parts II.B and II.C. 
 39. United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 40. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d. Cir. 1991). 
 41. United States v. Joon Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Chestman, 947 
F.2d at 566). 
 42. Id. at 1010 (citing Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568). 
 43. Id. at 1010-1011. 
 44. Id. at 1018. 
 45. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567-70. 
 46. Id. at 569. 
 47. Id. 
 48. United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 690 (S.D.N.Y.), rev’d on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 
(2d Cir. 1985). 
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relationship characterized by repeated sharing of confidential information, 
even without the clear duty of an agent to act in the best interest of a 
dependent beneficiary, took on the nature of a fiduciary relationship.49 This 
“less rigorous” version of fiduciary duty, though not generally accepted by 
the Chestman court in a criminal fraud context, allows a broader reach, and 
though lacking precision, appears closer to Powell’s construction in Dirks.50 
Chestman interprets the conundrum closer to Powell’s apparent intentions in 
Dirks and Chiarella. 
Powell’s understanding of a fiduciary relationship in Dirks is first and 
foremost the traditional configuration – one owed by an insider to a 
corporation’s shareholders, and upon knowing breach, inherited by a tippee 
from the insider tipper.51 Yet, Powell offered little or no discussion of a 
superior-inferior relationship. He focused rather on a notion of largely 
reciprocal confidentiality between tipper and tippee, not on a one-way duty 
to act in the best interest of another.52 Even recognizing the underlying 
relationship between a corporate insider and that corporation’s shareholders, 
Powell’s notion is markedly distinct from a true, one directional fiduciary 
relationship.  Not surprisingly, this distinction has been conflated and 
confused in the courts since Dirks.53 Courts appear to have continued to strive 
for accurate interpretation of the unclear rule in Dirks rather than to have 
seized the opportunity to clarify the nature of the duty to be found under 
Section 10(b), though Rule 10b5-2 may have handed courts just that 
opportunity twenty years ago. 
2. The Recent Focus on Personal Benefit 
In finding no fiduciary duty owed to a subject corporation’s 
shareholders by analysts learning of fraudulent accounting practices in that 
publicly traded corporation, Dirks shifted focus from defining an underlying 
would-be fiduciary duty to the nature of disclosure constituting breach of the 
duty.54 This judgment of purpose required determining whether tippers 
received a personal benefit in disclosing the fraud to tippees who then traded 
in the corporation’s stock.55  Such consideration became vital because 
 
 49. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 569-70 (citing United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 690 (S.D.N.Y.), 
rev’d on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983). 
 52. Id. at 655 (“The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired 
nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they have entered into a special confidential relationship 
in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate 
purposes.”). 
 53. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 773 F.2d. 438, 445-46 (2d Cir. 2014) (when analysis 
proceeds via the misappropriation theory rather than the classical theory, the personal benefit test has a 
more defining role in establishing the breach of a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty because it may involve 
deciding whether the relationship at issue in the fraud on the source determination is or is not meaningful); 
United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 54. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660. 
 55. Id. at 666-667. 
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“[w]hether disclosure is a breach of duty . . . depends in large part on the 
purpose of the disclosure.”56 Confidential information shared for a proper 
purpose would not constitute a breach, but such information shared for a 
personal benefit would. At first read, the decision appears to turn here, “[i]n 
the absence of a breach of duty to shareholders by the insiders, there was no 
derivative breach by Dirks.”57 Yet, the Court seems, at the same time, to 
hinge its decision on the finding that the “tippers received no monetary or 
personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding’s secrets, nor was their 
purpose to make a gift of valuable information to Dirks.”58 
If there is a real difference in distinguishing Powell’s analysis of the 
breach of fiduciary duty from other understandings of breach and fiduciary 
duty generally, it lies in part in the concept of Powell’s personal benefit test 
set out in Dirks.59 It may be that the personal benefit test has become the 
latest incarnation of the fiduciary conundrum – another manifestation of a 
duty of trust and confidence cloaked in a duty to act in another’s best interest.  
The would-be clarification of the personal benefit test came in 2016 
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s Salman60 decision.  The Court granted cert. 
in Salman to resolve an apparent disparity between the Second Circuit’s 
Newman61 decision and the Ninth Circuit’s Salman decision.62 Previously, 
the Newman court had held that a personal benefit was essential in finding 
Section 10(b) liability.63 Newman looked to Dirks to find the requirement of 
(i) a fiduciary breach by an insider, (ii) the inheritance of that breach by a 
trading tippee, and (iii) the trading tippee’s knowledge that the information 
resulted from that breach.64 From there, Newman noted that a personal 
benefit to the breaching insider must be found.65 Then, Newman held that to 
actually find Rule 10b-5 liability, the tippee trader must know of that 
personal benefit to the insider/tipper.66 This explication by Judge Barrington 
Parker, propounded in reviewing the Southern District’s jury instructions 
below, resulted in overturning the Southern District’s prior conviction in the 
case.67 
Moreover, as Judge Parker delved further into Newman, fleshing out the 
personal benefit analysis derived from Dirks, he explained that the concept 
of knowing of the personal benefit could be found either (i) where benefit to 
the tipper was pecuniary or (ii) where the tip entailing a tipper’s gift of the 
 
 56. Id. at 662. 
 57. Id. at 667. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 425 (2016). 
 61. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 62. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1092. 
 63. Newman, 773 F.3d at 447. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 448. 
 67. Id. 
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information to be traded upon would enhance the tipper’s reputation, which 
enhancement could only be inferred where a “meaningfully close personal 
relationship” exists between tipper and tippee.68 Here, Judge Parker wrote 
that a “mere friendship” would not meet this latter standard.69 Ultimately, of 
course, Newman turned on two conclusions. 70  First, the Newman court 
concluded that no inference could be drawn from the facts of the case as to 
a relationship of the analysts covering the Dell-NVDIA transaction at issue 
with the alleged tippees in finding any such personal benefit.71 Second, the 
court found that no meaningful personal relationship existed among the 
alleged investor relations insider tipper, industry analyst tippees, and 
disseminators.72  
In Salman, the U.S. Supreme Court apparently rebuked the Second 
Circuit’s application of the personal benefit test in Newman.73 Writing for 
the majority in Salman, Justice Alito made clear that Dirks would again 
control the general securities fraud analysis, and that the issue in the instant 
case would again center on the existence of a personal benefit to an insider 
tipper who informed a trading tippee.74 Justice Alito saw the turning point in 
the decision as simple. “Dirks makes clear that a tipper breaches a fiduciary 
duty by making a gift of confidential information to “a trading relative,” and 
that rule is sufficient to resolve the case at hand.”75 The tippee trader, Salman, 
was a brother-in-law of a tipping insider and close friend of an 
intermediary.76 Justice Alito repeatedly relied on language from Dirks, “[i]n 
particular, we held [in Dirks] that “[t]he elements of fiduciary duty and 
exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift 
of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.” Ibid.”77  
So the relationship of the tipper and tippee characterized as that of a 
close relative or friend was enough to infer the personal benefit and rely on 
Dirks to find liability in Salman while the Second Circuit had not found such 
an inference in Newman, albeit under clearly distinguished facts. In 
affirming Judge Rakoff’s Ninth Circuit Salman decision, Justice Alito took 
pains to qualify Judge Parker’s approach in Newman.He wrote,, “[t]o the 
extent the Second Circuit held that the tipper must also receive something of 
a ‘pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange for a gift to family or 
friends, Newman, 773 F. 3d, at 452, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that this 
requirement is inconsistent with Dirks.”78 This is to say that what really 
 
 68. Id. at 452. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 453. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 423. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 427. 
 76. Id. at 424. 
 77. Id. at 427. 
 78. Id. at 428. (emphasis added). 
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matters in Alito’s interpretation in Salman is consistent with the real meaning 
behind the fiduciary conundrum in Powell’s Dirks and Chiarella. That real 
meaning iswhether a relationship of trust and confidence exists, and whether 
it has been breached. Clearly, a family relationship (as in Salman) is declared 
to constitute a presumed relationship of trust and confidence, the breach of 
which would constitute a violation of Rule 10b-5. This is so notwithstanding 
the focus on the more narrowly framed issue of personal benefit in place of 
a would-be general fiduciary duty. 
After the Supreme Court spoke on the issue in Salman, the Second 
Circuit revisited the same personal benefit issue in its 2017 Martoma II 
decision,79 In Martoma II, Judge Katzmann turned again to the personal 
benefit test, looking to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Salman decision, and 
refused to recognize whether Alito’s opinion had actually rebuked Judge 
Parker’s preceding Newman decision in its interpretation of the personal 
benefit test.80 Martoma II affirmed a lower court conviction notwithstanding 
what it found to be inaccurate jury instructions regarding the personal benefit 
test.81 Pointedly, Katzmann’s majority opinion in Martoma II noted that the 
personal benefit test could be read in either of two ways – with the 
meaningful personal relationship between tipper and tippee necessarily 
included together with a tipper’s intent to benefit from providing the non-
public information to a tippee, or alternatively, either element found 
independent of the other.82  The Katzmann majority chose the latter reading 
(relying on the Second Circuit’s SEC v. Warde83), and then reasoned that the 
facts at trial were sufficient to meet that standard, justifying its affirmance of 
the lower court conviction, notwithstanding the jury instruction nuances.84 
Thus, a doctor’s disclosure of the not yet public Elan-Wyeth Phase 2 
Alzheimer drug trial results to an investor hedge fund manager was enough 
to demonstrate an adequate personal benefit either on the facts that the 
disclosing doctor received a quid-pro-quo-like consulting fee or on the facts 
that the disclosing doctor received a personal benefit with the intention of 
that the tippee benefit from the disclosure.85 
Since Powell and his construction of the would-be controlling fiduciary 
principle, the most influential judge opining on insider and outsider trading 
may be Jed S. Rakoff, albeit not as a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, but 
as a judge on the Southern District of New York, and as a designated judge 
 
 79. United State v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64 passim (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2665 (2019) 
[hereinafter Martoma II]. 
 80. Id. at 71. 
 81. Id. at 68. 
 82. Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 74. 
 83. SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 84. Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 74. See Thai H. Park, Newman/Martoma: The Insider Trading Law’s 
Impasse and the Promise of Congressional Action, 25 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 49-52 (2019) 
(discussing the personal benefit test in Martoma II and beyond). 
 85. Id. at 74-75. 
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on both the Second and Ninth Circuits.86 In both the Ninth Circuit’s Salman 
87 and in the Second Circuit’s Pinto-Thomaz,88 Judge Rakoff delved into the 
explication of fiduciary duty. Justice Alito affirmed Rakoff in the Supreme 
Court’s Salman decision and led the Court to reiterate Rakoff’s take on 
fiduciary duty from the Ninth Circuit, pointedly with no attention to Rules 
10b5-1 and 10b5-2.89 
In affirming Judge Rakoff’s Ninth Circuit Salman decision, the 
Supreme Court accepted Powell’s “principle” of fiduciary breach as 
controlling the finding of violations under Section 10(b).90 Alito wrote in his 
Supreme Court Salman decision affirming Rakoff: 
 
In Dirks v. SEC, 463 U. S. 646, this Court explained that a tippee’s liability 
for trading on inside information hinges on whether the tipper breached a 
fiduciary duty by disclosing the information. A tipper breaches such a 
fiduciary duty, we held, when the tipper discloses the inside information 
for a personal benefit. And, we went on to say, a jury can infer a personal 
benefit—and thus a breach of the tipper’s duty—where the tipper receives 
something of value in exchange for the tip or “makes a gift of confidential 
information to a trading relative or friend.” Id., at 664, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 77 
L. Ed. 2d 911.91 
 
Thus, the focus is on a breach of the Powell fiduciary principle 
enunciated in Dirks, which hinges on the existence of a personal benefit to 
the tipper and the tippee’s knowledge of the personal benefit. Yet, the 
underlying issue of interpretation of the fiduciary conundrum is consistent. 
What really is at issue remains whether a duty of trust and confidence exists, 
and whether it is breached. 
In both the Ninth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court Salman decisions, 
the authors are concerned to limit the permissiveness of information 
disclosure under the Second Circuit’s Newman92 decision, which 
permissiveness was heralded by a number of scholars.93 Newman held that 
we cannot infer a tippee’s knowledge of a personal benefit to his tipper when 
the relationship between tipper and tippee lacks “proof of a meaningfully 
close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, 
 
 86. See United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) and 
United States v. Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 87. See Salman, 792 F.3d at 1092. 
 88. See Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 295. 
 89. See Salman v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 420, 429 (2016). 
 90. Id. at 425. 
 91. Id. at 423. 
 92. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 874 (2015). 
 93. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professors, Stephen Bainbridge, M. Todd Henderson, and 
Jonathan Macey in Opposition to the United States of America’s Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En 
Banc at 1, United States v. Newman 773 F.3d 438 (2014), (No. 13-1837-cr(L)), 2015 WL 1064409; see 
also, A.C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68 SMU L. REV. 857, 861 (2015); 
Pritchard, supra note 18; A.C. Pritchard, Tributes to Professor Alan R. Bromberg: Dirks and the Genesis 
of Personal Benefit, 68 SMU L. REV. 857 (2015). 
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consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or 
similarly valuable nature.”94 Of course, the Newman Court again looked back 
to Powell’s Dirks decision.95 
In declining to follow a limited read of Newman, Rakoff wrote in the 
Ninth Circuit’s Salman, that doing so… 
 
 “would require us to depart from the clear holding of Dirks that the 
element of breach of fiduciary duty is met where an “insider makes a gift 
of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.” Dirks, 463 U.S. 
at 664. Indeed, Newman itself recognized that the “‘personal benefit is 
broadly defined to include not only pecuniary gain, but also, inter alia, . . . 
the benefit one would obtain from simply making a gift of confidential 
information to a trading relative or friend.’” Newman, 773 F.3d at 452 
(alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d 
Cir. 2013)).”96 
 
In all of this parsing out of the breach of a would-be fiduciary duty, the 
relationships that give rise to a duty, and the associated knowledge of a 
personal benefit inferred to be pecuniary if only relational, we find no 
attention given to Rule 10b5-2. One wonders why is there no discussion of 
Rule 10b5-2(b)’s standards of duties of trust or confidence particularly in the 
tipper-tippee scenarios where the misappropriation theory is most likely to 
be applied? Wasn’t this rule intended to address just this issue? Any of these 
cases could have proceeded under the misappropriation theory as 
promulgated in Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2. If they had, the relationships at 
issue would have been redirected from control by the insufficiently clear 
Dirks, to control by defined relationships of trust or confidence, either as 
enumerated or principled under Rule 10b5-2. 
B. MISAPPROPRIATION ADOPTION AND PROMULGATION  
If Powell defined the federal law of insider trading, the “classical” 
theory, under Section 10(b) with his 1980 Chiarella and 1983 Dirks 
decisions, major change came in 1997 with Justice Ginsburg’s adoption of 
the fraud-on-the-source misappropriation theory in O’Hagan9798 With 
O’Hagan, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the relationship giving 
rise to a duty to disclose or abstain from trading need not be limited to 
insiders owing such a duty to issuing corporation shareholders in whose 
stock disputed trades were made.99 Rather, a fraud on the source of the 
information, whatever that non-public source may be, could be enough to 
 
 94. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1094-95. 
 97. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (2015). 
 98. See Madden, supra note 2 at 58. 
 99. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 660. 
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establish the breach of a fiduciary-like duty or a relationship of trust or 
confidence leading to Section 10(b) securities fraud liability.100 
Somewhat surprisingly, the federal courts’ interpretation and 
application of the role of a fiduciary relationship in finding insider or outsider 
trading has remained unclear, or at least subject to debate, not only since 
Dirks, but even since the Commission’s subsequent promulgation of the 
misappropriation theory in Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2, together with Reg. FD 
back in 2000.101 Rule 10b5-1 “defines when a purchase or sale constitutes 
trading “on the basis of” material nonpublic information in insider trading 
cases brought under Section 10(b).”102  Under Rule 10b5-1, the “on the basis 
of” element is met where the trader has awareness of the material nonpublic 
information.103 Moreover, Rule 10b5-1(a) expressly applies to those trades 
that are made with an awareness of that material nonpublic information “in 
breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or 
derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, 
or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic 
information.”104 This rule obviously is both informed by, and contemplates, 
varied tipper-tippee scenarios at issue in prior Rule 10b-5 cases. 
Thus, Rule 10b5-1 incorporates the fraud on the source version of the 
misappropriation theory from Ginsburg’s majority opinion in O’Hagan.105 
At the same time, the rule fails to include the word “fiduciary” even while 
speaking to the all-important “duty of trust or confidence.”106 
Even under the misappropriation theory, in all of this parsing out of a 
would-be fiduciary duty, the relationships that give rise to it, and the 
associated knowledge of a personal benefit tied to it and inferred to be 
pecuniary if only relational, we still find far too little federal court attention 
given to Rule 10b5-2. Courts have failed to adequately embrace Rule 10b5-
2(b)’s standards of duties of trust or confidence and express categories of 
relationships giving rise to those duties notwithstanding the fact that the 
Commission expressly promulgated this rule to address just this issue. 
 
 100. See Madden, supra note 3, at 68 (noting Justice Ginsburg’s adoption of the government’s fraud 
on the source theory of misappropriation as presented in its brief). 
 101. See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA 
L. REV. 1315, 1319 (2009) (“Despite the Supreme Court’s explicit dictate that fiduciary principles 
underlie the offense of insider trading, there have been recent repeated instances in which lower federal 
courts and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have disregarded these principles. On some 
occasions, judicial adherence to fiduciary principles would have dictated rulings in favor of defendants 
charged with insider trading, but courts essentially ignored those principles.”). See also, Madden, supra 
note 2, at 70-75. 
 102. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 7881 (Aug. 15, 2000); 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2021), supra note 6. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. (emphasis added). 
 105. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 7881 (Aug. 15, 2000); 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2021), supra note 6. 
 106. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Any insider trading case since 2000 could have proceeded under the 
misappropriation theory as promulgated in Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2. If 
courts had made use of Rule 10b5-2, the relationships at issue would have 
been redirected from control by Dirks’ continually varied interpretations to 
control by more clearly defined relationships of trust or confidence, either 
enumerated or principled. Moreover, if courts had made more use of Rule 
10b5-2 since 2000, repeated (and repeatedly failed) attempts at legislative 
reform of insider trading might not have been necessary.107 
Rule 10b5-2’s duty of trust or confidence is itself in some distinction to 
the duty of trust and confidence tied to earlier Chiarella and Dirks precedent 
under Rule 10b-5, preceding the adoption of Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2.108  
That apparently trivial distinction is actually meaningful in parsing out the 
role of fiduciary duty in securities fraud not only under “classical theory” 
insider trading analysis, but also under the misappropriation theory of insider 
trading. Its repercussions affect whether the determinative duty need be a 
true fiduciary duty, and whether it need be comprised of care and loyalty 
together with confidentiality. Whether the breach of a duty of confidentiality 
alone is enough to meet the element is discussed further herein, infra. 
Rule 10b5-2 “addresses the issue of when a breach of a family or other 
non-business relationship may give rise to liability under the 
misappropriation theory of insider trading.”109 The rule sets forth three non-
exclusive bases for determining that “a duty of trust or confidence was owed 
by a person receiving information, and . . . provide[s] greater certainty and 
clarity on this unsettled issue.”110 Yet, again, Rule 10b5-2, while defining a 
duty of trust or confidence, does not mention the word “fiduciary.”111 This 
appears to be a logical intention to avoid the misuse and confusion of 
fiduciary relationships and associated terminology in Dirks and subsequent 
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court decisions. The fiduciary conundrum results from the misnomer of 
fiduciary relationships in the element of deceit which actually centers on an 
often reciprocal confidential relationship rather than a one directional 
obligation to act in the best interest of another. Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 
properly clarified the element by focusing on tits real essence -
confidentiality. The absence of the word fiduciary in these rules should be 
read as the Commission’s recognition that the inherently one directional 
obligation of an agent charged to act in the best interest of another is not 
where deceit turns.  Deceit turns on breach of confidence, whether by silence 
or disclosure. 
Again, Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 expressly codified the fraud on the 
source version of the misappropriation theory adopted in Justice Ginsburg’s 
majority opinion in O’Hagan.112 The misappropriation theory extends 
Section 10(b) anti-fraud coverage beyond the insiders addressed by the 
classical theory of insider trading, supplanting the temporary insider theory 
previously relied upon to address tippee liability.113 Again, neither the text of 
Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2, nor the rules’ proposing release, nor the release 
adopting the rules, includes the word fiduciary; all are expressly principally 
concerned with “dut[ies] of trust or confidence” that are more accurately the 
real concern of the element of fraud or deceit in insider trading.114 Proper 
application of these rules could have and still can lay bare the intentional or 
unintentional obfuscation of the fiduciary conundrum originating with 
Powell’s Dirks and Chiarella decisions.  
Yet, to date, the 2000 rules have been largely ignored. Federal cases 
decided under the misappropriation theory in the wake of O’Hagan include 
the Second Circuit’s 2001 United States v. Falcone,115 and Eleventh Circuit’s 
2003 S.E.C. v. Yun116 Each of these cases applied and expounded upon the 
fraud on the source misappropriation theory adopted in Justice Ginsburg’s 
O’Hagan decision.117 Yun emphasized the broad applicability of the 
misappropriation theory and noted that the misappropriation theory logically 
subsumes the classical theory, as it offers means to assess duty and breach 
whether that duty is born by an insider or outsider.118 While Falcone made 
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no reference to Rule 10b5-2, Yun gave the then new rule significant attention 
in its reasoning.119 Yun relied on the Commission’s justification for the rule 
in finding the breach of confidence in a spousal relationship as enumerated 
in Rule 10b5-2(b)(3) to constitute insider trading, commenting that 
Chestman’s reluctance to do so was to interpret the rule too narrowly.120  Yet, 
Yun’s consideration of Rule 10b5-2 would not become a consistent norm for 
federal courts analyzing facts under the misappropriation theory.121  
Five years after promulgation, in 2005, the Second Circuit eschewed 
Rule 10b5-2 and discussed Chiarella, O’Hagan, and Zandford122 in S.E.C. v. 
Dorozhko,123 determining that those precedents did not individually or in the 
aggregate require breach of duty to find a Section 10(b) violation.124  Rather, 
Dorozhko focused on deception and fraud outside of a defined fiduciary or 
like relationship creating a duty.125 Dorozhko also looked to the Fifth 
Circuit’s Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), 
Inc., 126 for support in this reading of precedent.127 Eight years after Rule 
10b5-2’s promulgation, in 2008, the Central District of California’s S.E.C. 
v. Talbot, applied the misappropriation theory in considering breach of duty 
by a corporation’s board member and ignored Rule 10b5-2. 128 
In contrast, only two years after promulgation, Judge Charles Breyer of 
the Northern District of California had looked to Rule 10b5-2 in United 
States v. Joon Kim.129 The Kim court broke ground in applying Rule 10b5-2 
even as it looked to Chestman for explication of the fiduciary conundrum.130 
While the Kim court did not rely entirely on the Rule 10b5-2, the court, 
similar to the Eleventh Circuit in Yun, noted that the rule was persuasive and 
expressly promulgated to sharpen the discussion of duty and breach in 
Chestman.131 
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 120. Id. at 1272-73. 
 121. See Madden, supra note 3, at 70-74. 
 122. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002) (focusing on the “in connection with” element and 
looking to O’Hagan to support the recognition of a summarily accepted fiduciary relationship between a 
stock broker and the broker’s clients). 
 123. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 124. Id. at 48. 
 125. Id. See also SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 19-21 (1st Cir. 2006) (discussing a wife’s deception 
of her husband as a source of material nonpublic information in an extended “in connection with” analysis 
under O’Hagan yet ignoring Rule 10b5-2). 
 126. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. V. Credit Suisse First Boston, 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 127. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 48 (2nd Cir. 2009) (citing Regents, 482 F.3d at 372, 389); see 
also, United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 2007) (discussing the misappropriation theory under 
O’Hagan and looking for a breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality). 
 128. SEC v. Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Kim, 184 F. Supp. at 1020. 
 131. Id. at 1014-15. 
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C. FIDUCIARY VERSUS FIDUCIARY-LIKE 
  In the outsider trading context, the federal courts have struggled to 
make sense of the place of fiduciary duty grounded in common law deceit 
and misrepresentation in violation of the SEC rules promulgated under 
Section 10(b).  A number of courts have referred to “duties of trust and 
confidence,” while Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 have expressly sought to define 
“relationships of trust or confidence” where misappropriation of material 
nonpublic information might exist.132 Yet, few court decisions since Dirks 
have explicitly illuminated fiduciary duty per se. 
Both O’Hagan and Chestman together were the primary sources for the 
Commission in proposing and promulgating Rules 10b-5-1 and 10b5-2.133 
Each decision discussed fiduciary duty, though the discussion in Chestman134 
delved more deeply into the duty as including a “relationship of trust and 
confidence” that is the “functional equivalent of a fiduciary.”135 O’Hagan 
involved a classic fiduciary relationship between a lawyer and client, albeit 
not between a corporate insider and shareholders.136 The functional 
equivalency in Chestman and the import of the fiduciary relationship in 
O’Hagan’s fraud on the source formulation, cohere in centering on a 
relationship of shared confidence. This does not, however, focus on the true 
and unique nature of a fiduciary relationship which, again, is characterized 
by a one-way obligation of one party to act in the best interest of another. As 
discussed, supra, the fiduciary terminology is a function of Justice Powell’s 
original language in Chiarella and Dirks and more accurately  about 
relationships characterized by often reciprocal confidentiality. Perhaps 
“fiduciary-like” should be read as a marker for such established confidence. 
Some alternate terminology must be consistently adhered to by the courts if 
we are to resolve the fiduciary conundrum. Certainly, Rules 10b5-1 and 
10b5-2 offer reasonable means to clarify the fiduciary conundrum. The rules’ 
formulation of duties of trust or confidence may be the best route to the real 
focus in Chiarella and Dirks and consequently virtually all insider or 
outsider trading cases since. 
In 2003, in S.E.C. v. Kirch,137 the Northern District of Illinois 
considered the legality of a CEO Roundtable member’s trade based on 
material nonpublic information that the member learned of at a Roundtable 
meeting.138  The court did not reference Rule 10b5-2, but reasoned,  
 
 132. See, e.g., Kim, 184 F. Supp. at 1010. 
 133. Proposed Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading No. 34-7787, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 82,846 (Dec. 20, 1999). 
 134. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 569. 
 135. United States v. Corbin, 729 F. Supp. 2d 607, 614, 616-17 (S.D.N.Y 2010). 
 136. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642. 
 137. United States SEC v. Kirch, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (the court notes somewhat 
similar facts in Kim and pointedly chooses not to be persuaded by Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1150-1151). 
 138. Id. 
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What is plain to this Court, and what it holds, is that the “duty of loyalty 
and confidentiality” owed by the outsider…to the person…who shared 
confidential information with him or her (the quoted phrase is from 
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652) is not limited to fiduciary relationships in the 
limited sense that requires such factors as control and dominance on the part 
of the fiduciary. Instead that “duty of loyalty and confidentiality” can be 
(and is) created by precisely the type of policy and expectations that are 
present in the Roundtable relationships here (see the discussion in Yun, 327 
F.3d at 1272-73). 139 
The facts in Kirch offer just the situation to which Rule 10b5-2 speaks 
and which so many courts have overlooked in turning back to Dirks and the 
fiduciary conundrum.140 Rule 10b5-2 offers a clearer standard that is more in 
tune with the purpose of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 –which it was 
intended to further. Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) specifically describes an enumerated 
duty of trust or confidence where persons have a “history, pattern, or practice 
of sharing confidences” such that those persons expect . . . that the recipient 
will maintain [that]. . . confidentiality.”141 
It is apparent that the federal courts’ focus on the fraud or deceit element 
since Chiarella and Dirks actually turned more on the breach of duty arising 
from a relationship characterized by often reciprocal and established 
confidentiality rather than on a true fiduciary relationship of one party 
obligated to act in the best interest of another. The “fiduciary-like” 
terminology is certainly closer to reality than fiduciary duty per se. Rule 
10b5-2 maintained this essence of confidentiality in the fraud or deceit 
element with the Commission’s reasonable promulgation of the 
misappropriation theory, leaving aside the misused and problematic 
language of fiduciary duty per se. Yet, precious few courts have taken the 
opportunity to employ Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 as a means of clarifying the 
law of insider and outsider trading under the misappropriation theory. 
Instead, court after court has continued to look back to Dirks and struggled 
with an inherently flawed fiduciary puzzle. Still, other courts have actively 
supported attacks on Rule 10b5-2 in an apparent rejection of the 
misappropriation theory.142 
D. DISCUSSIONS OF RULE 10B5-2 
Rule 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 were really all about the relationship of 
established confidence that courts have conflated with fiduciary duty. The 
Commission’s drafting of the rules relied on the Second Circuit’s 1991 
Chestman decision. 143 Chestman, informed by Chiarella and Dirks, offers 
the most developed discussion of fiduciary duty, unpacking its true meaning 
 
 139. Id. at 1150. (emphasis added). 
 140. Id. 
 141. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2021), supra note 7. 
 142. See, e.g., Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713. 
 143. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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and its connection to other relationships of trust and confidence. Donna Nagy 
has asserted that the SEC via Rules 10b5-1, 10b5-2, the courts, and a shift of 
focus toward the wrongful use of material information, have diminished the 
role of fiduciary duty that Dirks and Chiarella established.144 She, as well as 
others, calls for legislation to define insider trading liability, rather than 
leaving the door open to what she perceives will be further lower court 
confusion.145 
Certain courts have made more specific use of the rules. After the 
Eleventh Circuit’s 2003 Yun 146 decision made use of Rule 10b5-2, the 
Northern District of Texas addressed the rule in 2005 in SEC v. Kornman.147 
Kornman examined the SEC’s allegations against an attorney/consultant 
who allegedly traded in the stock of a merger target on information learned 
while the attorney/consultant met with executives of the merger target.148 The 
court looked to Chestman and the Southern District of New York’s SEC v. 
Cassese149 for guidance on whether a fiduciary duty or duty of trust and 
confidence had been formed between the consultant and the executive.150 The 
court also looked to Rule 10b5-2(1) to find an “enumerated duty of trust or 
confidence” “whenever a person agrees to maintain information in 
confidence.”151 This provision applied because the consultant’s policies 
required it, and the consultant had been accustomed to utilizing strict 
confidentiality policies and procedures, including engagement letter clauses, 
agreements, and memo writing which would typically be required in 
formalizing the relationship at issue, prohibiting any personal use of 
confidential information learned in the relationship.152 
The Kornman court, like Cassese, also looked to Kim for explication of 
fiduciary duty, focusing on finding “disparate knowledge and expertise” and 
“a persuasive need to share confidential information.”153 Indeed, each of 
Kim, Cassess, and Kornman construe that a fiduciary-like relationship can 
be established by a persuasive need to share confidential information. 
In denying a motion for summary judgement, the Kornman court 
reasoned further under Rule 10b5-2, “[b]ased on the allegations in the 
complaint, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the parties understood 
that a trust or confidence had been reposed . . . not to use this confidential 
information for personal gain.” 154 Moreover, the court noted that 
 
 144. Nagy, supra note 9; see, e.g., Prentice, supra note 10, at 372. 
 145. Id.; see infra Part II. 
 146. See supra Part II.B. 
 147. SEC v. Kornman, 391 F. Supp. 2d 477 passim (N.D. Tex., Dallas Div. 2005). 
 148. Id. 
 149. United States v. Cassese, 273 F. Supp. 2d 481(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 150. Kornman, 391 F. Supp. at 487-489. 
 151. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2021). 
 152. Kornman, 391 F. Supp at 480-81. 
 153. Kornman, 392 F. Supp. at 488 (citing Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1011 and Cassese, 273 F. Supp. 
2d at 486). 
 154. Id. at 492. 
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“understanding of the confidentiality can be readily inferred from the 
confidentiality safeguards employed by [the consultant].”155 Thus, Kornman 
offers one of the few clear and direct applications of Rule 10b5-2, five years 
after the rule became effective. In addition, the court set discussion of the 
rule in the context of related case discussions of Chestman and subsequent 
decisions, noting Chestman’s centrality to the rule.156 One wonders why 
more courts have not done the same or more with Rule 10b5-2. 
In 2009 SEC v. Lyon,157 the Southern District of New York relied 
primarily on Chestman to determine whether a duty of confidence was 
adequately plead.158 The creation of the duty was seen to depend in part upon 
knowing acceptance of a confidential relationship via confidentiality 
provisions included in private placement memoranda issued to prospective 
PIPE159 investors. While the Lyon court looked to Rule 10b5-1 in its analysis 
of the “on the basis of” determination of the trades involved, the court made 
no explicit reference to Rule 10b5-2 in its consideration of a duty of trust or 
confidence and the breach of that duty by the defendant’s trading without 
disclosing material nonpublic information obtained through the 
relationship.160 Yet, in 2015, the Southern District of New York offered one 
of the most robust discussions of Rule 10b5-2 in a case brought by private 
right of action, Veleron v. Stanley.161 Veleron focused on the materiality of 
non-public information Morgan Stanley employees had concerning a 
corporation, Magna, in which Veleron had invested in part with funds loaned 
by BNP Paribas and serviced in part by Morgan Stanley.162 The court looked 
to Rule 10b5-2 to find that Morgan Stanley’s contractual relationship with 
BNP Paribas was confidential and fiduciary-like such that non-public 
material information Morgan Stanley learned in the relationship could be 
actionable under Section 10(b) if Morgan Stanley traded on the basis of that 
information.163 
1. Agreement to Maintain Confidence 
Perhaps the most intense disagreement over the role of fiduciary duty 
in insider and outsider trading since the adoption of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)’s 
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 157. SEC v. Lyon, 605 F. Supp. 2d 531(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 158. Id. at 545-46. 
 159. “PIPE (Private Investment in Public Equity)”. 
 160. Id. at 547-48. 
 161. Veleron v. Stanley, 117 F. Supp. 3d 404, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“In Rule 10b5-2, the S.E.C. has 
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Trading, U.S. Securities and Exchange ‘Commission, http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm (“[Rule 
10b5-2] provides that a person, receiving confidential information under circumstances specified in the 
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 162. Id. at 430-35. 
 163. Id. at 436, 440, 451-52, 455, 457. 
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enumerated category, “whenever a person agrees to maintain information in 
confidence” 164 came in the Northern District of Texas’ S.E.C. v. Cuban.165  
This subpart was central to the much-debated battle in Cuban over whether 
Mark Cuban knowingly entered into a confidential relationship with an 
issuer who called to solicit his investment in a PIPE.166 (Cuban sold his 
already owned shares in the public corporation after being solicited and 
apparently becoming fearful of dilution resulting from the planned issuance 
of more shares.167)  
What constitutes such an agreement to maintain confidence? Must that 
agreement be an express oral or written contract? Can it be implied? These 
considerations are particularly difficult where the trade is executed by an 
outsider who may have established a relationship of confidence with an 
insider or quasi-insider–generally a subset of the outsider trading situation, 
sometimes considered a “temporary insider” situation.168 
The Fifth Circuit’s reversal and remand in S.E.C. v. Cuban169 centered 
on this very issue.170 “Given the paucity of jurisprudence on the question of 
what constitutes a relationship of “trust and confidence” and the inherently 
fact-bound nature of determining whether such a duty exists;” the court 
reasoned that it would send the matter back for further discovery and retrial 
(which the SEC ultimately lost).171 The Fifth Circuit refused to accept the 
lower court’s determination that the agreement to maintain confidence 
described in Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) required not only an agreement to maintain 
confidence, but also an agreement not to trade on the material information 
learned in that confidence.172 
The Northern District of Texas’ Cuban example is favorable in that it 
turned to Rule 10b5-2 and grappled extensively with the rule and the duty it 
defines. Yet, it is problematic. It failed to find in Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) adequate 
clarity to determine that the confidential relationship between Mark Cuban 
and the issuer CEO was of the nature intended to be covered by the rule. In 
fact, the Northern District attacked Rule 10b5-2, finding that it improperly 
premised Section 10(b) liability on simple confidentiality and not 
 
 164. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
 165. SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 729-31 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 
2010). 
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 170. Id. at 558. 
 171. Cuban, 620 F.3d at 558; Tom V. Ripper, Mark Cuban Beats The SEC, FORBES (Oct. 26 2013, 
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confidentiality coupled with an agreement not to trade.173 In its discussion, 
the Northern District dug into the usual laundry list of precedent decided 
long before the rule’s promulgation. The court’s judgement on the rule was 
in apparent error.174 Yet, the Fifth Circuit maneuvered around the issue on 
review, leaving the direct challenge of the Rule 10b5-2 standard 
unresolved.175 
2. Challenge under Chevron  
In the Third Circuit’s 2014 United States v. McGee,176 the defendant 
appealed his conviction under Rule 10b5-2, in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania’s 2012 United States v. McGee,177 on the theory that conviction 
under the rule lacked the required finding of fiduciary duty under Section 
10(b).178 Thus, the battle over Rule 10b5-2 on appeal in McGee II focused on 
the relationship between an insider tipper and an outsider tippee.179 McGee 
II considered whether a tipper-tippee relationship in which the parties were  
in amentor-mentee (Alcoholics Anonymous co-members) relationship 
creates a fiduciary duty under Rule 10(b).180The principal challenge to Rule 
10b5-2 in McGee II was that the SEC had exceeded its rule-making authority 
and violated Chevron by promulgating the rule. The challenge was that 
deception must exist to convict under Section 10(b) and that deception in a 
tipper-tippee scenario requires a fiduciary duty and a breach thereof by a 
tippee’s disclosure of material nonpublic information. 181 Writing for the 
Third Circuit, Aldisert found that Section 10(b) left open ambiguity as to 
what constitutes a “deceptive device” and that the SEC “filled the gap” in 
the regulation with Rule 10b5-2. 182 Indeed, the Third Circuit went on to 
accurately read precedent on the fiduciary conundrum, writing, “Supreme 
 
 173. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 730-731; See Prentice, supra note 10, at 3 (“The trial judge [in Cuban] 
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basis to find that the understanding between the CEO and Cuban was that he was not to trade, that it was 
more than a simple confidentiality agreement.”); see also Andrew Verstein, Insider Tainting: Strategic 
Tipping of Material Nonpublic Information, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 725 passim (2018) (discussing the 
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 182. McGee II, 763 F.3d at 313. 
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Court precedent does not unequivocally require a fiduciary duty for all § 
10(b) nondisclosure liability. In O’Hagan, though the defendant’s duty to 
disclose undoubtedly arose from his position as a fiduciary, the Court 
stressed that “This is distinct and broader than a fiduciary duty, per se.” 183 
Moreover, Judge Aldisert noted in McGee II that “[t]he SEC explicitly 
rejected limiting liability to those who share “business confidences.”184 The 
SEC instead favored a facts--and-circumstances test and noted that the type 
of confidences historically shared between parties could be a relevant 
factor.”185 The McGee II court prudently found that the facts of the AA based 
mentorship and friendship in McGee I and McGee II were just what the 
Commission had in mind in adopting Rule 10b5-2(b)(2)–a relationship 
showing a pattern of shared confidence.186 This important point supports the 
claim that the nature of the relationship at the heart of insider trading liability 
under Section 10(b) is often reciprocal and always one of established 
confidence, not one characterized by a one-way fiduciary obligation to act in 
the best interest of another. 
Few courts have been so bold as Aldisert’s Third Circuit in not only 
embracing and applying Rule 10b5-2 but in freely defending the rule’s attack 
under Chevron in the wake of the Cuban battle and calling out the precedent 
on the fiduciary conundrum with clarifying accuracy and simplicity. There 
is no good reason to challenge the rule, which clearly passes Chevron muster 
and offers a plausible standard for the relationship giving rise to a duty of 
confidence at the core of deception and fraud under Section 10(b) generally. 
To ignore Rule 10b5-2 and to only look back again and again to the quagmire 
of Powell’s language in Dirks is to willfully dispose of a solution to the 
fiduciary conundrum. Unlike McGee II, too many federal courts have done 
just that. 
III. FIDUCIARY DUTY? 
When we think of fiduciary duty, we think generally of one’s positive 
obligation to act in the best interest of another (and the negative obligation 
not to act in one’s self-interest as it would likely work against the interests 
of the fiduciary’s principal or beneficiary).187 The fiduciary relationship 
generally derives from some express, implied, formal or informal 
relationship that one has accepted or to which one’s willful actions have 
equitably given rise.  It is often constituted in the principal-agent relationship 
where the agent must act in the best interest of the principal, not her own. In 
the insider trading context, it is intuitively clear that an officer or director (or 
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a key informed employee) has a duty to shareholders of the corporation with 
which she has such a defined relationship, beyond a duty to the corporate 
entity itself.188  Certainly, much state corporate law has been well-developed 
statutorily and in state courts to make clear and apply the duties of care and 
loyalty comprising such fiduciary relationships.189 The core of the fiduciary 
relationship is a one-way duty to act in the best interest of another. This duty 
does not address relationships concerning broader, simpler, and often 
reciprocal confidentiality, which, notwithstanding the fiduciary conundrum, 
are the actual concern of Section 10(b) securities fraud. 
One way to solve the fiduciary conundrum in securities fraud is to 
jettison any requirement to find a duty of confidence in order to convict or 
find liability under Section 10(b). This is Donna Nagy’s suggestion upon 
digesting the decreasing role of fiduciary duty in federal securities fraud 
cases.190 Nagy views Rule 10b5-2 as “contributing” to the “demise of 
fiduciary principles in insider trading.”191 
Nagy has argued that courts have inconsistently relied on the fiduciary 
based approaches in Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan and that liability under 
section 10(b) really turns on wrongful use of confidential information with 
or without any fiduciary relationship and associated duty.192 Professor Nagy 
is surely correct that “Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan evidence a Supreme 
Court willing to stretch fiduciary principles to no small degree, when doing 
so facilitates a desirable policy outcome.”193 She is also correct to surmise 
that “the Court’s methodology may well have emboldened lower courts to 
approach new issues with similar results-oriented reasoning.”194 To resolve 
the fiduciary conundrum, Professor Nagy would have us dispose of the focus 
on the breach of a duty under Section 10(b) in favor of a focus on the 
wrongful obtaining of material inside information.195 However, casting away 
this essential element of securities fraud – the basis of fraud or deception – 
may be going too far. 
 Another approach, from Robert Prentice, at least in terms of Section 
10(b) violations based on tippee trading, is to return to the temporary insider 
approach, or beef up the classical theory of insider trading, even as applied 
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to outsiders.196 To his point, Prentice has identified the key part of the 
problem he is offering to solve, that “[a]lthough there is technically a 
difference between the terms “fiduciary relationship” and “confidential 
relationship,” the courts often use these terms interchangeably.”197 This is the 
heart of the fiduciary conundrum, a conflating of actually distinguished 
terms and meanings. 
Alan Strudler and Eric Orts have attempted to sort out the fiduciary 
conundrum by promoting a fraud on the investor theory of Section 10(b) 
liability grounded in deontological moral theory.198 Their understanding of a 
deontological approach centers on the view that causing harm to another 
constitutes moral wrong.199 In applying deontology to the fiduciary 
conundrum, Strudler and Orts wrote, “[o]n our theory, one has a duty under 
the law of fraud to refrain from trading securities on the basis of material 
nonpublic information without effectively disclosing the information unless 
one has a superior equitable right to the information which may derive from 
intelligent analysis, skillful observation, or even luck.”200 This harm 
balancing, or calculation of the lesser harm approach, is another alternative, 
though it perhaps fails to elucidate the nature of the root duty to be applied 
to an insider or outsider trader. Strudler and Orts assert, “[w]e argue that 
there are good moral reasons, even in the absence of a fiduciary relationship, 
to recognize a duty to disclose in certain circumstances when people with 
material nonpublic information trade with those who lack such 
information.”201 Ultimately, Strudler and Orts propose that a fraud on the 
investor misappropriation theory would most accurately identify those 
investors harmed by securities fraud and thus best apply their deontological 
moral theory.202 But in arguing that the fraud on the source version of 
misappropriation does not depend on a fiduciary relationship and does not 
identify a relevant victim of fraud, Strudler and Orts miss the more important 
role of confidence. It is the often reciprocal relationship of confidence 
captured in Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 that make the fraud on the source 
theory work. When confidence is breached, the non-breaching party is 
wronged – constituting the essence of the fraud and deceit integral to Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 
Other approaches to reforming the law on insider trading include cost-
benefit analysis, a return to parity-of-information under Cady Roberts, 
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general fairness, property rights analysis, duty to the marketplace and 
legislation imposing the same.203 
This article contends that the fiduciary conundrum was largely solved 
by Rule 10b5-2 twenty years ago, but most federal courts have failed to make 
use of it. Rather than explicitly and consistently shifting the duty discussion 
under Section 10(b) to one of confidence and eschewing an analysis 
premised on fiduciary duty per se, courts have defaulted to the precedent 
chain going back to Dirks, if not Chiarella. This has left us with a 
“[t]heoretical mess.”204 This, even though Rule 10b5-2 enumerated for us 
twenty years ago relationships of “trust or confidence” and obviously left the 
fiduciary language by the wayside. One can only conclude that the 
Commission’s logical redirection to a duty of confidence has been either 
willfully resisted or too often inadvertently ignored by our federal courts. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING RULE 10B5-2 
The fraud on the source misappropriation theory can just as logically 
apply to insiders as to outsiders. Whether the source of the inside information 
is a classical insider or an outsider, the duty to the source that would exist 
under the classical theory would also exist under this version of the 
misappropriation theory. The fraud on the source version of the 
misappropriation theory adopted in O’Hagan often finds fraud in the 
deception by a tippee trading on material nonpublic information learned 
from the source without disclosing the trade to the source.205 
Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 were intended to clarify and codify the 
misappropriation theory.206 These rules offered a clear and logical shift to 
analyze deception in securities fraud cases under a duty of confidence rather 
than a confused and inconsistently adhered to fiduciary duty and breach 
standard. They offered at least a partial solution to the fiduciary conundrum. 
If courts would routinely apply Rule 10b5-2 to insider and outsider trading, 
all instances of breach of often reciprocal relationships of confidence would 
be covered without the necessity of classical theory verbiage focused on a 
fiduciary duty owed to shareholders. 
The scenarios that Rule 10b5-2 in its present form cannot address are 
those that do not involve established relationships of confidence, whether or 
not enumerated under Rule 10b5-2. Such scenarios are of two basic 
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paradigms:207 The first exists where a trader misappropriates or steals 
material nonpublic information from a source with whom he lacks an 
established relationship of confidence. The second exists where, without 
deception, a trader receives, happens upon, or finds material nonpublic 
information from a source with whom he lacks an established relationship of 
confidence. The former we should care about and redress. The latter we 
should not. There is no good reason that an innocent finder should be 
prohibited from, or punished for, profiting on good luck and her own willing 
risk.  
John Coffee has opined that “the current reach of the insider trading 
prohibition is both arbitrary and incomplete. Egregious cases of 
informational misuse are not covered, while less culpable instances of abuse 
are criminalized. For the long term, the scope of the insider trading 
prohibition needs to be better rationalized.”208 Coffee went on to propose 
Rules 10b5-3 and 10b5-4 to address the scenarios of theft and finding 
described above.209 Coffee views his proposal in part as the codification of 
Dorozhko (finding deception under Section 10(b) without fiduciary duty) in 
the same vein that the SEC promulgated Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2, with clear 
Chevron deference.210 
Coffee’s solution generally makes sense. At the same time, however, it 
circumvents the essential characteristic of securities fraud, the relationship 
of confidence. The fiduciary conundrum has been so perplexing because, 
even as courts have mistermed, misinterpreted, and misapplied the nature of 
the often reciprocal relationship of confidence, they have been right to attend 
to it as an essential element of securities fraud. 
Misappropriation or theft of material nonpublic information from 
someone with whom the misappropriator or thief has an established 
relationship of confidence is presently covered under the existing framework 
of Rule 10b5-2. It need only be consistently applied. Because a finder 
situation involves no relationship of confidence, it entails no duty nor breach 
of duty and no misappropriation or theft, so any trading benefit obtained by 
an innocent finder need not be redressed under Section 10(b). In such an 
instance, there simply would be no instance of fraud or deceit. It is only in 
situations where such a theft occurs outside of an established relationship of 
confidence that the current securities fraud framework of Rule 10b5-2 cannot 
offer redress. 
Coffee is right in his proposed rules discussion and analysis of 
Dorozhko—the deception captured under Section 10(b) is broader than 
causing one to believe what is false or disbelieve what is true.211 Deception, 
indeed, more generally entails trickery or “intentionally misleading by 
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falsehood spoken or acted.”212 So, too, fraud broadly includes cheating.213 
Note, also, that Coffee sees agency as the source of a duty of confidentiality, 
the breach of which is the heart of securities fraud, not the duty and breach 
of formal fiduciary duty per se.214 Indeed, the duty of confidence is not 
synonymous with the fiduciary obligation to act in the best interest of 
another. Coffee’s discussion supports this article’s reading of an often 
reciprocal relationship of confidence being the correct focus in securities 
fraud— the focus that can resolve the fiduciary conundrum. 
A broader notion of fraud and deceit can be captured and promulgated 
by the Commission in modifying existing Rule 10b5-2 to incorporate a 
proper understanding of the theft of material nonpublic information. Of 
course, the underlying wrongdoing of misappropriation is the unauthorized 
use of another’s property.215 Under the misappropriation theory of securities 
fraud, that “property” is generally material nonpublic information that would 
affect stock price. Theft is the fraudulent taking of another’s property.216 We 
need not go deep into property law analysis to incorporate instances of theft 
(incorporating the misappropriation of material nonpublic information) 
between or among parties lacking established relationships of confidence in 
order to sufficiently revise Rule 10b5-2 to capture such theft outside of 
relationships of confidence, such as in Dorozhko. We can simply add the 
following to the existing Rule 10b5-2. 
 
(c) where, notwithstanding the forgoing, a person willfully obtains 
material nonpublic information without consent; i.e. by theft, and that 
person knows or should know that the information is material and 
nonpublic, such theft shall constitute both (i) “fraud or deceit” and (ii) a 
constructive breach of a duty of trust or confidence. 
 
This modification is true to the spirit and meaning of fraud, deceit, 
misappropriation, and theft. It will give courts a robust tool codified in Rules 
10b5-1 and 10b5-2 as proposed to fully, clearly, and consistently solve the 
fiduciary conundrum. Indeed, theft includes the notion of fraud as well as the 
taking or use of property without consent. Liability under this addition to 
Rule 10b5-2 would, of course, still depend upon the thief’s use of the stolen 
information in connection with the purchase and sale of securities. The “in 
connection with” component only strengthens the understanding of theft as 
essentially a form of fraud that breaches a constructive trust because it entails 
the knowing use of the information for personal benefit. Similar to Coffee’s 
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proposed Rules 10b5-3 and 10b5-4, this modification of Rule 10b5-2 to 
include a subpart (c), supra, can be properly accomplished by the 
Commission in accord with Chevron deference. It would fill a gap in the 
existing rules. More importantly, it would provide a solution to the otherwise 
still expanding fiduciary conundrum. It only requires our federal courts to 
fully apply a modified Rule 10b5-2 to all instances of alleged securities fraud 
where securities trades are made based upon material nonpublic information 
obtained via relationships of confidence which are breached. Under the 
proposed modified rule 10b5-2, those relationships may be established, 
enumerated, or constructively constituted in the act of one willfully taking 
the information from another without consent. 
This approach would cover all instances of securities fraud foreseeable 
under Section 10(b), except where material nonpublic information is 
willingly given to and traded upon by an unknowing tippee. In that instance, 
the tippee would be akin to a finder and only the tipper would be liable 
because the tipper would be willfully breaching his duty of confidence to the 
information source. The modified rule would cover (i) a party breaching a 
relationship of confidence to an original source of material nonpublic 
information, and (ii) a party taking material nonpublic information without 
consent, which, though facts and circumstances will of course vary, spans 
the other actionable scenarios of Section 10(b) liability. 
 
